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Abstract
It is generally agreed that boards are endogenously determined institutions that
serve both oversight and advisory roles in a firm. While the oversight role of boards
has been extensively studied, relatively few studies have examined the advisory role
of corporate boards. We examine the participation of political directors on the boards
of natural gas companies between 1930 and 1998. We focus on the expansion of
federal regulation of the natural gas industry in 1938 and 1954 and subsequent partial
deregulation in 1986. Using data sets covering the periods from 1930 to 1990 and
1978 to 1998, we test whether regulation and deregulation altered the composition
of companies’ boards as the firms’ environment changed. In particular, did regulation
cause an increase and deregulation a decrease in the number of political directors
on corporate boards? We find evidence that the number of political directors increases
as firms shift from market to political competition. Specifically, the regulation of
natural gas is associated with an increase in the number of political directors and
deregulation is associated with a decrease in the number of political directors on
boards.
I. Introduction
The basic unit of analysis in corporate governance is the board of directors.
Directors monitor, advise, punish, and reward. Given these different tasks,
it is not surprising that the typical corporate board includes members with
quite diverse backgrounds.1 April Klein points out that directors typically
* The authors wish to thank Sam Peltzman (the editor), an anonymous referee, Bennet Zelner,
Steve Ferris, Robert Lawless, Per Fredrickson, Rui de Figueiredo, Peter Klein, Oliver Wil-
liamson, Kira Markiewicz, Daniel Snow, and the participants at the 2000 annual meetings of
the International Society for New Institutional Economics, Tubingen, Germany, the Public
Choice Society annual meetings and the annual meeting Network Industries in Transition, and
seminar participants at Claremont McKenna College, Washington University, the University
of California, Irvine, and the University of California, Berkeley. We thank Pam Shramek for
her research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Deregulation and Board
Composition: Evidence on the Value of the Revolving Door.”
1 In Germany, for example, corporations have two boards, one to monitor the management
of the firm and the second to assist management in the operation of the firm.
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come from other industries (such as banking), medicine, the academy, law,
and politics.2 Neither the advisory role nor the diversity of background that
role would seem to produce has been the focus of studies of corporate gov-
ernance. Instead, most have focused on the role of outside directors (those
not having other business ties to the firm), regardless of their backgrounds,
in solving agency problems between the chief executive officer (CEO) and
shareholders.3 Only recently have some studies begun to examine the advisory
role of boards and its impact on the diversity of directors’ backgrounds.
These studies generally find that the external environment of the firm (or the
firm’s “economic needs,” to use Klein’s terminology) determines the type
of outside director chosen by the firm. Most of these studies, however, have
been cross-sectional in nature.4
Unlike Stacy Kole and Kenneth Lehn or Richard Geddes and Hrishikesh
Vinod, who focus on the general adaptation of board structures to regulation
and deregulation,5 this paper examines the advisory role of political directors
on corporate boards by examining the effect on board composition of specific
changes in the firms’ external environment, specifically, changes in regula-
tion.6 If political directors’ value is primarily related to their knowledge of
or connections to the regulatory process, we would expect such directors to
be more valuable once comprehensive regulation begins and less valuable
after deregulation.
We use two data sets to evaluate the role of external environment in
determining board composition. The first is derived from Moody’s Industrial
Manual and Moody’s Public Utility Manual for 1930, 1940, 1950, 1955,
1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. The second uses annual data that were derived
from proxy statements filed with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for the period 1978–98. We test whether the imposition
of regulation in 1938 and 1954, and subsequent deregulation in 1986, altered
board compositions of firms in the natural gas industry. In particular, did the
regulatory events lead firms to increase the number of political directors on
2 April Klein, Affiliated Directors: Puppets of Management or Efficient Directors? (unpub-
lished manuscript, N.Y. Univ., Ctr. L. & Bus., January 1998).
3 Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously De-
termined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 Econ. Pol’y Rev. 7 (2003),
provides a recent survey of the literature on the role and performance of boards of directors.
4 See Klein, supra note 2, and Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside
Directors Play a Political Role? 44 J. Law & Econ. 179 (2001), as examples of studies focusing
on the advisory role of boards. Klein uses a cross-sectional sample for 1992–93. Agrawal and
Knoeber utilize three cross sections from 1987, 1988, and 1999.
5 Stacy Kole & Kenneth Lehn, Deregulation and the Adaptation of Governance Structure:
The Case of the U.S. Airline Industry, 52 J. Fin. Econ. 79 (1999); Richard Geddes & Hrishikesh
Vinod, CEO Tenure, Board Composition and Regulation, 21 J. Reg. Econ. 217 (2002).
6 We use the term “political directors” in a broad sense to include directors whose back-
grounds suggest involvement in or access to the political regulatory environment, not just
former regulators and politicians. The operationalization of our definition is described in Section
IIIA infra.
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their boards in the earlier periods and then reduce the number of political
directors after deregulation?
In both data sets, we find evidence that some board members serve a
political role and that changes in the external environment change the demand
for directors. After regulation, the data show a marked increase in the number
of political directors. Moreover, the 1986 deregulation of natural gas extrac-
tion is associated with a decrease in the number of political directors on the
boards of extraction companies, while the number of political directors is
unchanged at firms in other industry segments not affected by the deregulation
of extraction. The results are confirmed using a fixed-effects model and a
model that examines only newly appointed directors. Specifically, we find
that political regulators are less likely to be added to a board after deregulation.
The paper proceeds in Section II with a review of the literature on the
determinants of corporate board composition and a brief history of regulation
in the natural gas industry. In Section III, we discuss the data sources and
conduct a preliminary analysis of the data. Section IV presents our predictions
and estimation results for both event periods using the Moody’s data and the
proxy statement data. Section V offers some concluding remarks.
II. Deregulation and Board Composition
A. Board Composition and the Firm’s External Environment
An operating assumption of much of the corporate governance literature
is that boards are endogenously determined institutions.7 The primary focus
of this literature has been on the role of the board in mitigating the agency
conflicts between the CEO and shareholders.8 If boards exist to monitor
shirking by the CEO and management, then outside directors should be more
effective monitors than employees are.9 On the basis of this premise, much
of this literature focuses on the proportion of outside directors and the link
between performance and corporate governance.10
Exceptions to this focus are studies by Klein and Agrawal and Knoeber,
7 See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 3; and Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Cor-
porate Governance, 5 Indus. Corp. Change 277 (1996).
8 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.
Law & Econ. 301 (1983).
9 See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (1985); Michael Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO
Turnover, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 421 (1988); and Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny,
Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 842 (1989).
10 See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 3, and M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The
Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board
Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 Fin. Rev. 1
(2003), for reviews of the empirical literature that attempts to measure the performance effects
of corporate governance structure.
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which focus on the advisory role of the board.11 Although the monitoring
versus advising theories are by no means disparate, the advising literature
focuses on the human capital that directors bring to the company. Board
members’ human capital is important not merely because it may affect board
members’ effectiveness in detecting shirking by the CEO, but also because
it gives the CEO access to independent advice that he or she might not get
from full-time employees.12 In addition, the board may represent part-time
employment for highly skilled labor. The company may not need the services
of an investment banker or lobbyist on a day-to-day basis, but their presence
on the board means the company has placed them on a sort of retainer.13 In
short, the firm’s external environment, or “economic needs,” determine at
least in part who is chosen as a director.
One of the most important aspects of a firm’s external environment is the
presence or absence of regulation. There are a number of reasons why reg-
ulation may change the external environment of the firm, but all suggest that
regulation shifts the focus of the firm, at least to some degree, from market
competition to political competition. At least since George Stigler’s paper
on the theory of economic regulation, economists have examined the ways
in which regulation can benefit an industry.14 Sam Peltzman and Richard
Posner both model regulation as a competition for rents.15 Such competition
would imply that political directors are added to the board to assist the firm
in capturing these regulatory rents. In this context, there are many hypotheses
for the appointment of political directors to the corporate board. Pablo Spiller
posits that postindustry employment provides the regulator a reward for
favorable regulatory treatment.16 He finds that regulators who preside over
more lenient regulatory periods are more likely to receive postindustry em-
ployment. Political directors also represent a means of lobbying regulatory
agencies.
Rent seeking could also be defensive in nature. Political directors may be
added to the board to protect quasi rents from regulation.17 This theory
proposes that regulation has the potential to destroy firm-specific assets.
11 Klein, supra note 2; Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note 4.
12 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975); and Harold Demsetz,
Theory of the Firm Revisited, in The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development
(Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney Winter eds. 1991).
13 See Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myths and Reality (1971); and Agrawal & Knoeber, supra
note 4.
14 George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971).
15 Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211
(1976); and Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. 335 (1974).
16 Pablo Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency
Theory of Regulation, Or “Let Them Be Bribed,” 33 J. Law & Econ. 65 (1990).
17 Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Ex-
tortion (1997).
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Lobbying is used not to gain monopoly rents but to protect the firm’s assets
from expropriation or dissipation. In addition, political directors may possess
industry-specific knowledge or insight into the political process or the threat
of future regulation.18 This industry knowledge may make former regulators
effective monitors of corporate management. Regardless of the motivational
intent, each of these theories suggests that regulation produces a need for
directors who know something about the political landscape and regulatory
horizon to serve on the board in an advisory role.
An alternative to the external environment theory is the theory that a
director’s background presence is unrelated to the firms’ external environ-
ment. There are several reasons why firms’ external environment might not
affect the composition of its board. The first reason is that directors serve
only a monitoring function. After all, the board is designed to serve an
oversight role, and most companies have access to information from salaried
employees. The basic prediction of this alternative theory is that regulation
would not affect the likelihood that political directors are present on a board.
For example, if former regulators have special industry knowledge or man-
agement expertise, that value would not necessarily increase with regulation
or dissipate with deregulation.
One other alternative is that many directors are simply window dressing
whose sole function is to provide another outside director who will not cause
problems for management. Several studies have suggested that regulated firms
may be less actively monitored by shareholders than firms in a competitive
market.19 It is possible that political directors are neither more effective
monitors than other types of directors nor involved in rent-seeking activities
but are on the boards of regulated industries because there is less market
pressure to appoint more effective monitors and greater opportunities for
shirking by the CEOs of regulated companies. In effect, regulated firms need
or simply have less effective monitoring by their boards than firms that are
not regulated. If this is the case, political directors are simply window dress-
ing. They are placed on the board for the same reason as relatives of the
CEO: they are unlikely to cause trouble for management. For this reason,
we also estimate the impact of deregulation on the overall composition of
boards and on the proportion of insiders to determine whether other measures
of monitoring effectiveness respond to regulatory changes.
18 Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note 4, argues that this background may create a certain human
capital value for political directors.
19 For example, see note 5 supra.
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B. From Market to Political Competition: A Primer on
Natural Gas Regulation
The business environment of natural gas companies has changed dramat-
ically over the history of the industry.20 The natural gas industry does not
truly begin until the mid-1920s, when metallurgical advances allowed for
the manufacture of pipe that could withstand the pressure that made long-
distance pipelines feasible. By the 1930s, a vast network of pipelines had
been created. Federal regulation of the natural gas industry began in 1938
with the Natural Gas Act,21 which gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
authority to regulate the prices pipeline companies charged local distribution
companies. The act arose to fill a gap in state regulatory control over local
utility rates. Because natural gas pipelines crossed state lines, the courts had
been reluctant to allow individual states to regulate them. The act originally
covered only the prices of natural gas associated with the transportation and
sale for distribution to customers. It did not cover wellhead sales by inde-
pendent producers.
Although the pipeline industry had by all accounts accepted regulation,
the period 1938–54 was in fact a period of growing contention surrounding
the regulatory process. There are several reasons for this growing contention.
The first, and most obvious, was that the pipeline industry’s effectiveness in
winning entry barriers made lobbying to prevent entry a standard part of the
pipeline business. The second major source of political contention in the
1938–54 period was state regulators. A growing conservation movement in
the states, where conservation literally meant to restrict supply, had begun
to affect producers.
The final source of contention proved the most important. In the period
1938–54, the gas industry expanded dramatically. The number of households
using natural gas increased from 8.3 million in 1937 to 21.1 million in 1955.22
With this rise in consumption came a rise in price so, where transport cost
had made up the majority of a customer’s bill in 1938, by the 1950s the fuel
cost constituted the majority. By the late 1940s, calls were being heard in
Congress to extend regulation to producers. Compounding these demands
was the regional structure of the natural gas industry that had evolved during
the period. As the Appalachian gas fields dried up, production shifted to the
Southwest, which pitted the three distinct segments of the industry—pro-
duction, transport, and distribution—against each other in Congress.
20 This section draws heavily on the discussion of the natural gas industry found in Robert
L. Bradley, Oil, Gas, and Government: The U.S. Experience (1996); Stephen Breyer, Regulation
and Its Reform (1982); and M. Elizabeth Sanders, The Regulation of Natural Gas: Policy and
Politics 1938–78 (1981).
21 Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 76–688, 52 Stat. 821 (June 21, 1938).
22 Sanders, supra note 20, at 59–60.
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At several points during the late 1940s, the FPC commissioners tried to
expand their regulatory authority to include producer prices. The Natural
Gas Act of 1938 is ambiguous in its wording and, in theory at least, could
be interpreted to allow the FPC to control wellhead prices. Producer states
in the late 1940s grew concerned, and on two occasions tried to enact leg-
islation that would clarify that the FPC did not have the authority to regulate
the prices charged by independent producers.23 These bills were favored by
producer states (South and West) and opposed by consumer states (North,
Midwest, and East). Even before it was established that natural gas regulation
extended to the producer, it was obvious that regulation would be
redistributive.
The FPC’s authority was greatly expanded following Philips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, which granted the commission authority to regulate the
price at which field producers sold gas to pipelines.24 The Court’s ruling
overturned an FPC decision that it could not regulate unaffiliated producers.
Consequently, the FPC post Philips controlled prices all the way from ex-
traction to the sale of gas to local distribution companies. Prior to Philips,
the FPC had authority over a few hundred pipelines. Post Philips, it controlled
the prices charged by thousands of independent producers. The Philips de-
cision was regulatory redistribution via the courts, and Congress quickly
sought to reverse it. In 1955, William Fulbright and Oren Harris introduced
a deregulation bill. Although the 1955 bill was less far reaching (it allowed
some regulatory controls on producer prices), the vote mirrors the geographic
interests in earlier votes. In the end, however, the bill was vetoed.25
The rates charged in the 1950s seem to have been influenced by the
Republican control of Congress, with prices favoring producers. By the Ken-
nedy and Johnson administrations, however, the FPC was attempting sys-
tematic reductions in prices, and the redistribution had begun in force. The
rate-hearing process involved considerable discretion for regulators and fre-
quently ended in federal court. M. Elizabeth Sanders and Stephen Breyer
argue that the system began to unravel by the late 1960s when gas shortages
began to emerge in the Northeast.26 During the “oil crisis” of the early 1970s,
the shortage problem became particularly acute as the rate-setting process
failed to keep prices in line with inflation, let alone natural gas demand.
Congress responded with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which stip-
ulated the gradual decontrol of prices for new gas wells (those drilled after
23 The first of these was the Moore-Rizley bill in 1947; the second, the Harris-Kerr bill,
passed in 1949.
24 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 681–84 (1954).
25 The reason given for the Eisenhower veto was that South Dakota senator Francis Chase
claimed in a speech that a Washington lawyer in the employ of the oil producers offered him
a $2,500 contribution in exchange for his vote. Eisenhower claimed he could not tolerate the
scandal and vetoed the bill.
26 See note 20 supra.
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TABLE 1
Dates of Changes in the Regulation of Natural Gas
Industry Segment Type of Regulation Beginning Year Ending Year
Exploration No price regulation . . . . . .
Extraction/production Federal regulation of
wellhead prices 1954 1986
Pipelines Federal regulation of prices
charged to distributors 1938 Not deregulated
Distribution Local regulation of
distribution prices Throughout the sample period
Note.—The two federal regulatory events, which cover pipelines and extraction, are the focus of this
study. As discussed in the text, the primary event is the 1954 regulation and subsequent deregulation in
1986 of production and wellhead prices.
1977) and let prices grow at the rate of inflation.27 Deregulation of extraction
companies did not proceed quickly. Prices for new deep wells were dereg-
ulated in 1979. Not until 1985 were all new wells deregulated. Finally, all
extraction was deregulated in 1986 by Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) Order 451, which set the regulated price above the market-
clearing price.28 In July 1989, President Bush signed the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act, which ended rate regulation by the federal government.29 The
distribution of natural gas and its transportation by pipeline remains regulated.30
The long history of regulation detailed above suggests one fact quite
clearly: as early as 1938, and by at least 1954, the business environment of
natural gas producers encompassed information not only about gas fields and
customers but also about Washington, D.C. If Klein and Agrawal and Knoeber
are correct and the composition of boards responds to the external needs of
the firm, regulatory changes between 1938 and 1986 should alter the com-
position of boards to include political directors.31
C. Defining Regulation
Given the different types and durations of regulatory regimes in the natural
gas industry, we must be careful to clearly identify the particular regulatory
events on which we focus. Table 1 presents a summary of the different forms
27 Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–621, 92 Stat. 3350 (November 9, 1978).
28 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22168 (June 18,
1986).
29 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub L. No. 101–60, 103 Stat. 157 (July
26, 1989).
30 In addition, and partly in response, to federal price deregulation, the natural gas industry
also experienced a disintegration between the production, transportation, and distribution stages
in the early 1990s. These changes occurred after the deregulatory events of interest here. For
a thorough discussion, see Paul MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Market: Sixty Years of Regulation
and Deregulation (2000).
31 See note 4 supra.
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of regulation that affect the various stages of natural gas production and
distribution and the periods of the various regulatory regimes. The regulatory
expansions concern different dimensions of production. Local distribution is
regulated by the states throughout the entire sample period, while exploration
is never regulated during the period. The 1938 act imposed federal price
regulation on pipelines that continues throughout the period. The 1954 Philips
decision extended federal price regulation to the wellhead, or production
level, which regulation was gradually removed between 1978 and 1986. In
our first data set, the identification of regulation’s effect on board composition
comes from the 1938 regulation of pipelines and the 1954 Philips decision
concerning natural gas extraction. In the second data set, identification comes
from the 1986 deregulation of natural gas extraction.
One concern is that we may be confounding the effects of state and local
regulation by treating the effects of pipeline and wellhead price regulation
(which is federal) as identical to distribution price regulation (which is con-
ducted at the state level). The nature of our sample mitigates that concern.
The sample, detailed below, focuses on those gas companies listed in Moody’s
Industrial Manual and a sample of interstate pipeline companies in Moody’s
Public Utility Manual. As a result, the sample is primarily made up of
extraction companies and pipeline companies, with a few holding companies
that have gas properties and a small number of exploration companies that
do not extract gas themselves. In a few cases, a firm also has distribution
assets; however, in each of those cases the firm’s involvement in distribution
spans the sample period and is therefore not subject to changes in regulatory
exposure.32 Consequently, we are estimating the effect of changes in the
federal regulatory environment. We construct our proxy statement sample to
mirror the Moody’s sample.
A related problem is identifying when a company becomes regulated. Many
of the companies in our sample are diversified. For example, a number of
our extraction companies have smaller pipelines, some of which cross state
lines. It is possible they are covered by the 1938 act. Our solution to this
problem is to treat companies as regulated if they have a line of business in
any industry segment regulated by the federal government. Thus, for the
Moody’s sample, we define a firm as regulated in a given year if (1) it lists
one of its lines of business as owning a pipeline in any year after 1938 and/
or (2) it lists production as a line of business in the 1955–80 period. We
construct a categorical variable equal to one if the firm has a regulated line
of business in a given sample year and zero otherwise. Note that this definition
biases our results toward zero; pipeline ownership does not necessarily mean
the firm is regulated, since the pipeline may not cross state boundaries. The
alternative to coding pipeline holdings as regulated after 1938 is to simply
32 Even when firms with distribution assets are removed from the sample entirely, the results
are substantively unchanged.
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code all firms as regulated in 1954 and deregulated after 1986. This produces
results similar to the above definition.
Regulation is similarly defined in the proxy data sample. For the proxy
sample, it is also important to date when deregulation occurred for extraction
companies. Clearly, the 1978 act deregulated some portion of production. It
appears, however, that most extraction companies held wells that were still
regulated into the 1980s. Since we do not know the exact point at which
each company’s operations were completely deregulated, we treat deregu-
lation as having occurred in 1986 for all firms. Because this would tend to
bias our results toward zero (any company that held no regulated wells may
have made its governance changes earlier), we interpret our estimates as
lower bounds.
One additional concern is that all of the natural gas producers in the early
portion of our sample, and a majority of firms in later periods, also produce
oil. The oil industry was also subject to regulatory expansion during our
sample period. The oil industry experienced import quotas from 1959 until
1973 and price regulation from 1973 to 1980. In one sense, this does not
confound the estimation strategy, since regulation of the natural gas industry
begins earlier than import quotas and ends after oil price deregulation33 and,
in the case of interstate pipelines, continues after the end of our sample. The
larger issue, however, is that during the whole period starting with the New
Deal there is a rise in the scope of regulation and that scope is reduced in
the 1980s. Therefore, some care should be taken in attributing the rise in
political directors to the advent of natural gas regulation in particular. It may
instead reflect an overall shift in the external regulatory environment of firms
in the industry.
III. Director Classification and Trends
A. Moody’s and Marquis, 1930–90
To create our sample of corporate boards we identify all the natural gas
companies listed in Moody’s Industrial Manual. Moody’s begins near the
turn of the century and is one of the most comprehensive industry guides
in existence. It provides varying amounts of information on all firms listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange (the
vast majority of publicly traded companies even in the early period of the
sample). Periodically, usually every 10 years in the early part of the sample
period, Moody’s lists all the firms in the directory by industry. We include
all firms listed by Moody’s that identify themselves as producing natural gas.
We constructed the sample of directors with 10-year increments because of
33 See Bradley, supra note 20, for a discussion of the timing of import restrictions relative
to the regulation and deregulation of the natural gas industry.
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TABLE 2
Sample Summary: Moody’s-Marquis Sample
Year Total Directors
Located Directors
FirmsN % Located
1930 390 280 71.79 42
1940 976 699 71.62 113
1950 847 671 79.22 92
1955 849 669 78.8 92
1960 1,522 1,068 70.17 156
1970 1,109 786 70.87 110
1980 1,646 1,081 65.67 179
1990 1,155 705 61.04 121
Note.—The firms listed for 1955 are taken from the 1950 Moody’s Industrial
Manual, hence the same number of firms in those 2 years. The Located Directors
columns refer to those directors listed by Moody’s for whom we are able to collect
biographical data from Marquis Who’s Who in Commerce and Industry or Who’s
Who in Finance and Industry.
the difficulty of identifying the directors’ biographies. Although Moody’s
was published prior to 1930, we limit ourselves to 1930–90 because of data
availability issues described below. We also include 1955, given the mid-
decade expansion of regulation. Thus constructed, our sample consists of
eight observation-years of data. There is no similar list of natural gas com-
panies in the companion volume, Moody’s Public Utility Manual. To con-
struct a sample of interstate pipeline companies we use M. Elizabeth San-
ders’s listing of the 51 major natural gas pipelines in 1947.34 We then construct
the sample by finding these pipeline companies in the 1930–90 Public Utility
Manuals.
The chief advantage of Moody’s is that it lists the names of the directors
and major officers of the corporation. We are able to identify 8,494 directors
in the sample period. Table 2 contains a breakdown of the sample. The major
problem is that Moody’s provides no biographical information for directors
and executives prior to the 1980s. To obtain this information for the earlier
years, we utilize a second data source, Marquis Who’s Who in Commerce
and Industry, and its continuation, Who’s Who in Finance and Industry. The
Marquis directory begins in 1938 and is fairly extensive in its coverage.
However, it is produced at irregular intervals. As shown in Table 2, between
the two sources we are able to construct a sample that includes biographical
data on more than 60 percent of the directors in any given observation year.
Using the biographical information in Marquis, we broadly classify di-
rectors along two lines. First, we categorize directors by their professional
background. Directors are classified as Washington lawyers (those indicating
that they practice in Washington, D.C., or are members of the Washington
34 See Sanders, supra note 20, at 62.
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bar), non-Washington lawyers, politicians (elected representatives from either
state or national government and nonelected officials not associated directly
with regulation such as ambassadors and agency heads), and former regulators
(defined as former FPC or FERC employees or employees of public service
commissions or congressional oversight committees).
We are also interested in whether regulation induces other changes in board
composition because such changes also offer evidence on the importance of
regulation in determining board composition. For example, finding a growing
diversity of backgrounds among board members (that is, more of other non-
political director types) caused by regulation might suggest that the demand
for regulators is not unique to their regulatory background. For this reason,
we also classify directors as academics, accountants, bankers (either invest-
ment bankers, commercial bankers, or private investors), CEOs of indepen-
dent companies with 5 or more years of experience in the gas industry,
consultants, and engineers (if they have backgrounds in engineering, chem-
istry, or geology). We also indicate that a director has gas industry experience
if his or her primary occupation for at least the previous 5 years was in the
natural gas or oil industry. The background classifications are similar to those
used by Klein and by Agrawal and Knoeber.35
We also indicate the board member’s business relation to the firm. The
corporate finance literature typically classifies directors as insiders, outsiders,
or “gray.” Gray directors are not employees of the firm but have some type
of business relation with the firm in addition to their board position (for
example, as an outside legal counsel or investment banker). Unfortunately,
such gray affiliations are not uniformly indicated in Marquis or on the earlier
proxy statements (see below). Consequently, we classify nonindependent
directors (1) as insiders if they are employees of the firm, (2) as retirees of
the firm, or (3) as relatives of the current CEO.
Finally, different types of political directors may well be substitutes for
one another (for instance, a Washington lawyer may be as effective as a
former regulator), and political backgrounds are not necessarily exclusive
(about half the Washington lawyers are also former regulators). To allow for
this sort of substitution, we construct several composite categories that in-
clude the number of directors falling under one or more of various political
classifications.
One problem with the Moody’s-Marquis data is that we are limited to
those directors we can identify in Marquis. While there is no obvious reason
why the Marquis sample should be biased, a nontrivial proportion of the
total number of directors must be omitted from any analysis. We would like
some method of verifying our results with a more complete sample of bio-
graphical data.
35 See Klein, supra note 2; Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note 4.
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TABLE 3
Sample Summary: Proxy Statement Sample
Year Firms Directors
1978 4 26
1979 16 135
1980 17 148
1981 23 197
1982 25 210
1983 29 243
1984 32 268
1985 29 235
1986 27 228
1987 29 232
1988 27 246
1989 45 414
1990 43 421
1991 44 421
1992 45 472
1993 43 435
1994 46 466
1995 43 418
1996 44 412
1997 41 380
1998 33 319
Note.—The table shows the number of firms identified in
COMPUSTAT as operating in the natural gas industry for which
proxy statements could be obtained with information on board
directors and the number of individual directors.
B. The Proxy Statement Sample
Given the limitations of the Moody’s-Marquis data, we supplement our
analysis with an additional sample that consists of 96 natural gas firms. Table
3 gives the breakdown by firm-year and total number of directors. The sample
was constructed by taking the first 150 firms on a list extracted from
COMPUSTAT of all firms in natural-gas-related Standard Industrial Clas-
sification (SIC) codes for the years 1978–98 and removing those exclusively
in the pipeline or distribution segment of the industry. Copies of proxy
statements were obtained for each of the firms for all available years of
operation between 1978 and 1998. During this period, firms typically pro-
vided information on board members’ previous employment and relational
ties to the firm (such as relatives).36 If all 96 firms had the full 20 years of
data, we would have a total of 1,920 firm-years. We fall short of this total
because (1) several firms have missing proxy statements for several years,
making it impossible to construct the board, and (2) the majority of firms
operated only for a subset of the sample period. In fact, we never have more
36 Rule 14a-3(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires proxy statements to furnish
current information about nominees for directorships; see Klein, supra note 2, for a discussion.
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Figure 1.—Average board share of directors classified as Washington lawyers for natural
gas pipeline and natural gas production companies in the Moody’s sample by observation
period.
than 46 firms in any given year between 1978 and 1998; for 1978 we have
only four firms.37
The proxy data set has several advantages over the Moody’s-Marquis
sample and one major disadvantage. The major advantages are that it is easier
to collect, and hence we are able to utilize annual data, and that it contains
complete biographical information on all directors as well as their tenure of
service and their holdings of the firm’s stock. The major disadvantage is that
the data extend back only to 1977. For this reason, we analyze both data
sources independently.38
C. Preliminary Data Analysis
Figure 1 presents the proportion of directors that are Washington lawyers
by year and industry segment. Of the 80 directors listed in Marquis for
production companies in 1930, we find none fitting our definition of Wash-
37 The number of firms in the sample increases after 1988 when the SEC began to require
broader use of electronic filings. Prior to 1988, the number of electronic filings is dramatically
lower and paper copies of filings are not readily available, even from the SEC itself.
38 Although proxy statements exist prior to 1978, our efforts to obtain them from the SEC
met with limited success. We decided to confine the analysis of proxy statements to the post-
1978 period after receiving several blank sheets of paper from the SEC with “Best Available
Copy” stamped on them.
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ington lawyers, while a small fraction of pipeline company board members
are Washington lawyers. For pipeline companies, the number of Washington
lawyers rises dramatically in 1940 and remains around 8 percent throughout
the remainder of the sample period. For production companies, the number
of Washington lawyers rises until 1970 and begins to fall thereafter. At its
peak in 1970, over 4 percent of the identified board members fit our definition
of Washington lawyers. Given that production companies are deregulated
beginning in 1978, this rise and fall is consistent with the external environ-
ment hypothesis that regulation requires firms to focus attention on the po-
litical process. The trends for regulators and the composite indices are similar.
Overall, the preliminary evidence in Figure 1 suggests that the function of
political directors is in part dependent on the regulatory process. In the next
section, we control for firm- and industry-specific factors by including other
variables.
IV. Estimation and Results
A. Control Variables for the Moody’s Data Set
Moody’s provides firm-specific data that we use as controls given previous
findings in the literature. Moody’s contains consistent information on the
firm’s sales, its line(s) of business, and the size of its board. Because sales
numbers may not be directly comparable from decade to decade, we construct
a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was in the bottom quartile of sales
for a given year and a similar variable for firms in the top quartile. We also
include the size of the board, as the opportunity cost of a given director type
is likely to change as the board size grows. It is not obvious that, as a board
increases in number, the new additions will be of any particular type, but
adding a political director (or any type) to a board consisting of four members
may involve a greater cost than adding such a director to a board of 20.
We construct a series of nonexclusive dummy variables equal to one if
the firm is a holding company (that is, owns other companies and hence
would be covered by the 1935 act), engages in exploration for natural gas
or production of natural gas, operates a natural gas pipeline, and/or engages
in the distribution of natural gas to retail or residential customers. We also
include a control for firms that hold leases that are produced by other firms.
These variables control for the general economic environment common to
all firms in a specific segment of the industry.39
Finally, we use the dichotomous regulatory variable as defined above to
indicate whether the firm is subject to regulation. We define a dichotomous
categorical regulation variable, coded as one for production operations in
39 Ideally, we would like to have some performance measures, but Moody’s data are limited
in their stock information for all but the largest companies. We have far better performance
measures for our proxy statement sample.
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firm years from 1955 to 1980 and zero otherwise. As noted above, for holding
companies or firms with pipeline operations, we code the regulation variable
as one after 1938. Companies engaged solely in exploration activities are coded
zero throughout the sample. The summary statistics are given in the top section
of Table 4.
B. Control Variables for the Proxy Data Set
The independent variables for the proxy data set come from both the firms’
proxy statements and COMPUSTAT. In general, we follow the existing lit-
erature on board composition in choosing our controls.40 We include controls
for the general characteristics of the board, such as the average age of the
board, the average years of service of the board, and the concentration of
ownership among board members. We also include return on equity and CEO
tenure. Finally, we include the firm’s debt-to-asset ratio to account for external
financial pressures and sales as a proxy for firm size.
Our primary measures of the firm’s external regulatory environment are,
as with the Moody’s data, the firm’s line of business and whether the firm
is regulated.41 We again define a dichotomous categorical regulation variable
for each line of business. Production operations are coded one in firm-years
prior to deregulation (pre-1986) and zero afterward. Pipeline operations are
coded one and exploration activities are coded zero throughout the sample
period. As before, the firm’s regulation variable is coded one if any of its
lines of business is regulated in the observation year. The lower section of
Table 4 contains summary statistics of the sample.
C. Estimation Procedure
Because the dependant variable is a count of the number of directors of
each type on the board, ordinary least squares will be biased and inconsistent.
Following Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Weisbach,42 we estimate a Pois-
son model. If we define l to be , where X is the independentlog (l)p Xb
variables and b are the coefficient estimates, then the probability of n board
40 In particular, we follow Klein, supra note 2; Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial
Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. Fin. 831 (1993); and David
Yermack, Higher Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. Fin. Econ.
185 (1996), in specifying our control variables.
41 The proxy statements and COMPUSTAT SIC codes do not identify companies that hold
leases for other production companies or holding companies independently from the other
categories.
42 Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composition, 19
RAND J. Econ. 589 (1988).
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members being of director type i is . Thus, the like-n[exp (l)# l ] / (n !)i
lihood function is
N T
L(b)p [C  exp (X b) n X b], i jt ijt jt
jp1 tp1
where Ci is a constant, nijt is the number of directors of type i at firm j in
period t, N is the total number of firms, and T is the total number of years.
D. Results from the Moody’s Data
The cross-sectional results of the regulation effect for the Moody’s-Marquis
sample are presented in the top section of Table 5. We find that regulated
firms have on average 1.2 more Washington lawyers on their boards than
unregulated firms. Given an average board size of around nine, this represents
a sizable increase. We find no significant effect for non-Washington lawyers.
Former regulators are also more common on the boards of regulated com-
panies. Regulated companies have .876 more regulators than nonregulated
firms. Consistent with our preliminary data analysis, there is no significant
difference in the number of former politicians between regulated and unre-
gulated periods. Not surprisingly, the composite measures are generally sig-
nificant. Composite 1 (all four political director types), composite 2 (Wash-
ington lawyers, politicians, and regulators), and composite 4 (Washington
lawyers and regulators) are statistically significant. Only composite 3 (pol-
iticians and regulators) is not significantly different across regulated and
unregulated boards.
1. Results of Moody’s Panel Estimation
Following Hermalin and Weisbach,43 we also estimate the model using
fixed effects because there may be firm-specific characteristics that do not
change over time but are not captured by the dependent variables.44 With
fixed effects, the log likelihood becomes
N T T
L(b)p C  n log exp [(X  X )b] , { }2 ijt jt js
jp1 tp1 sp1
where C2 is a constant and Xjs is the within-firm average of the dependent
variables.
Table 5 also presents the fixed-effects estimation for the Moody’s data.
The fixed-effects estimation is problematic given the criteria for firm obser-
43 Hermalin & Weisbach, note 42 supra.
44 One might ask why we include both cross-sectional and panel results. The simple answer
is that the cross-sectional results allow us to explore the possibility that firms entering the
market after deregulation may have fewer political directors than incumbent and/or exiting
firms.
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Moody’s-Marquis sample:
Board director characteristics:
Number of Washington lawyers (a) .2565217 .577261
Number of non-Washington lawyers (b) .615942 .9356856
Number of former politicians (c) .184058 .4783023
Number of former regulators (d) .1913043 .5036122
Composite 1 (a, b, c, and d) .8971014 1.186336
Composite 2 (a, c, and d) .4797101 .8348504
Composite 3 (c and d) .3072464 .6564006
Composite 4 (a and c) .3782609 .7271172
Number of bankers .7173913 1.054324
Number of outside experienced chief executive officers .5318841 .9236441
Number of engineers or geologists .5753623 .8791911
Number of consultants .0942029 .3509821
Number of retirees of the company .0550725 .2636884
Number of relatives of the chief executive officer .0666667 .32086
Number of accountants .4072464 .5933396
Number of academics .1463768 .4822178
Board characteristics:
Number of insiders 3.604348 2.009768
Number of board members 9.3 4.080628
Firm characteristics:
Regulated .7550725 .4295122
Bottom sales quartile for the current year .3111882 .4623471
Top sales quartile for the current year .1936853 .3950503
Proportion of company years as holding company .0594203 .2365811
Proportion of company years holding land leases
developed by other companies
.4442374 .4967032
Proportion of company years in exploration .5888889 .4918188
Proportion of company years in extraction .8869565 .3214233
Proportion of company years operating a pipeline .2697723 .4433791
Proportion of company years in distribution .4132505 .4920675
Proxy statement sample:
Board director characteristics:
Number of Washington lawyers (a) .4554745 .7233491
Number of non-Washington lawyers (b) .870073 1.04114
Number of former politicians (c) .5153285 1.145222
Number of former regulators (d) .3737226 .8292241
Composite 1 (a, b, c, and d) 1.544526 1.774532
Composite 2 (a, c, and d) .8627737 1.308486
Composite 3 (c and d) .589781 1.182059
Composite 4 (a and c) .6525547 1.019767
Number of bankers 1.90073 1.773443
Number of outside experienced chief executive officers .979562 1.153252
Number of engineers or geologists .6394161 1.150855
Number of consultants .7927007 1.01492
Number of retirees of the company .2277372 .5359489
Number of relatives of the chief executive officer .2262774 .5157278
Number of accountants .4248175 .7228296
Number of academics .4452555 .8387518
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TABLE 4 (Continued )
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Board characteristics:
Number of insiders 2.626277 1.670315
Number of board members 9.255474 4.638431
Average years of service of board 9.123122 4.402134
Average age of the board 59.19626 6.530359
% Equity held by board 9.992701 20.51411
Chief executive officer tenure 11.05715 9.779333
Firm characteristics:
Proportion of regulated firm-years .4686131 .4993785
Proportion of company years in extraction .7532847 .4314146
Proportion of company years in exploration .2773723 .4480289
Proportion of company years operating a pipeline .2058394 .4046091
Proportion of company years in distribution .1270073 .3332245
Rate of return on equity 3.325007 194.1794
Debt/assets .297738 .2334445
Sales 895.908 2,771.406
Note.—The pooled Moody’s-Marquis data set includes 4,340 director observations from 615 firm-
years over the period 1930–90. The proxy statement sample includes annual data from 1978–98 for 685
firm-years and 6,326 director observations.
vations: a firm must exist in at least two periods, those periods must cover
a regulatory event (namely, regulation or deregulation), and the firm must
have at least one of the director types in question during the sample period.
The last criterion is particularly problematic, as we know from the preliminary
data analysis that a number of unregulated firms simply do not have certain
director types on their boards. The reduction in sample size is evident in the
number of observations and number of companies. For example, in the case
of Washington lawyers, only 51 of the 412 firms in the Moody’s sample meet
the criteria, leaving us with 187 observations. Nevertheless, the models that
estimate the number Washington lawyers and former regulators are statisti-
cally significant, which indicates that regulation resulted in a given firm
adding .74 more Washington lawyers and .876 more former regulators to its
board. Results for all of the other political directors, although not significant,
are positive. The composite measures are more precisely estimated owing to
larger sample sizes. For all composites, we find statistically significant in-
creases, on the order of .286 to .876 additional political directors, when a
firm is regulated. Thus, even when we control for firm-specific effects, we
find evidence that regulation induces a shift toward political directors on the
boards of the same firms.
2. Newly Appointed Directors
The evidence presented above suggests that regulation induces firms to
retain political directors. Both the fixed-effects and cross-sectional models
TABLE 5
Impact of Regulation on the Number of Political Board Members by Type: Moody’s-Marquis Data, 1930–90
Washington
Lawyers
(1)
Non-Washington
Lawyers
(2)
Former
Politicians
(3)
Former
Regulators
(4)
Composite 1
(5)
Composite 2
(6)
Composite 3
(7)
Composite 4
(8)
Cross-sectional estimation (N p 867):
Regulated firms 1.440**
(.266)
.306**
(.117)
.032
(.188)
1.059**
(.253)
.347**
(.096)
.733**
(.143)
.452**
(.156)
1.215**
(.191)
Firm-specific fixed effects:
Regulated firms 1.185**
(.321)
.257
(.135)
.014
(.264)
.971**
(.301)
.299*
(.119)
.679**
(.190)
.536*
(.215)
.994**
(.235)
Observations (N) 354 491 292 344 524 450 399 430
Companies 79 122 62 75 135 108 92 101
Cross-sectional estimation, new directors only (N p 541):
Regulated firms 1.534**
(.555)
.402
(.266)
.272
(.358)
.977*
(.448)
.654**
(.199)
1.125**
(.287)
.772*
(.307)
1.140**
(.332)
Firm-specific fixed effects, new directors only:
Regulated firms 1.713*
(.679)
.289
(.289)
.318
(.549)
1.406*
(.623)
.807**
(.252)
1.580**
(.398)
1.296**
(.454)
1.587**
(.467)
Observations (N) 216 292 181 194 329 285 255 259
Companies 49 72 43 44 85 70 62 61
Note.—Values are the results of a Poisson model that estimates the number of board members of each political director type and the four composite measures. The
four composite types are defined as follows: composite 1 includes all four political types; composite 2, Washington lawyers, politicians, and regulators; composite 3,
politicians and regulators; and composite 4, Washington lawyers and regulators. Each cross-sectional specification includes controls for line of business (exploration,
production, pipeline, distribution, and holding company), board size, and firm size (dummy variables for firms in the bottom quartile of sales for the sample year and
the top quartile of sales for the sample year). For the sake of brevity, only the coefficient on regulation is presented. In the cross-sectional models, board size is uniformly
positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and small firms (those in the bottom quartile of sales) are uniformly negative and significant at least at the 5 percent level.
Otherwise, none of the explanatory variables is consistently significant across director types. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. For non-fixed-effects estimation, standard errors are clustered on firm.
 Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
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suppose that a political director can be removed from the board in any year.
There are, of course, reasons why a company might wish to retain political
board members even if their political connections are no longer valuable for
the firm. Directors may have developed firm-specific knowledge over their
tenure on the board that warrants their retention. In addition, board members
are frequently elected to multiple-year terms and are not likely to be dismissed
midterm. To control for this we reestimate the above models examining only
newly appointed directors. In the Moody’s sample, we determine new di-
rectors by examining the board in the first year the company appears in the
data (say 1960), and we assume that all directors are continuing. We then
move to the next period (1970) and code all directors not on the board in
the previous period as new. With this definition, and given the number of
firms that appear only once, the number of new directors is relatively small,
and our sample size is reduced to 391.45 In addition, we include the existing
stock of directors of the new director’s type who already sit on the board at
the time of the new appointment. The stock variable controls for the fact
that if a company already has one or two Washington lawyers, for example,
an additional Washington lawyer may not be as valuable.
The results, presented in Table 5, indicate that regulated firms appoint
more non-Washington lawyers and former regulators to be new directors. On
average, the regulated firms appoint .923 new Washington lawyers, .519 more
non-Washington lawyers, and .905 more former regulators to new director-
ships. Again, the composite measures are positive and generally significant.
Only composite 3 (former regulators and politicians) is not statistically
significant.
The last rows of Table 5 present results of the new-director model using
firm-specific fixed effects. Washington lawyers are more common. The model
indicates that for a given regulated firm, 2.558 more Washington lawyers are
newly appointed. Again, the composite measures are more precisely esti-
mated, with all but composite 3 being statistically significant and positive.
In all other cases, newly appointed political directors are more common on
the boards of regulated firms.
3. Regulation and Other Director Types
Table 6 presents the results for the other types of directors in the Moody’s
sample. We find little or no evidence that regulation affects the selection of
other types of directors. The only statistically significant differences are that
bankers and consultants are more common on regulated boards. It is also
important to note that the number of insiders and size of the board do not
differ significantly across regulated and unregulated firms. In addition, the
45 Note that our technique for identifying new directors means that all directors are classified
as continuing the first year the firm appears in our data.
TABLE 6
Impact of Regulation on the Number of Other Board Members by Type
Insiders
(1)
Board Size
(2)
Bankers
(3)
Outside CEO
with Experience
(4)
Engineers
(5)
Consultants
(6)
Retirees
(7)
Relatives
(8)
Accountants
(9)
Academics
(10)
Moody’s-Marquis data, 1930–90
(N p 867):a
Regulated firms .008
(.046)
.035
(.038)
.290**
(.107)
.107
(.157)
.039
(.108)
1.330**
(.406)
.179
(.375)
.404
(.369)
.344**
(.128)
.163
(.265)
Proxy statement data, 1978–98
(N p 619):
Regulated firms .147
(.131)
.169*
(.074)
.332
(.184)
.464*
(.199)
.048
(.391)
.386
(.269)
.068
(.444)
.071
(.411)
.115
(.279)
.345
(.686)
Note.—Values are the results of a Poisson model that estimates the number of board members of each nonpolitical director type, as well as the number of insiders
and overall board size. For the sake of brevity, only the coefficient on regulation is presented. The specifications reported for the Moody’s-Marquis data include controls
for line of business (exploration, production, pipeline, distribution, and holding company), board size, and firm size (dummy variables for firms in the bottom quartile
of sales for the sample year and the top quartile of sales for the sample year). In each of the director type specifications, board size is uniformly positive and generally
significant at the 5 percent level or better. Board size itself appears positively and significantly related to firm size (measured by the quartile dummies). Otherwise, none
of the explanatory variables is consistently significant across director types. For the proxy statement data, each specification includes controls for line of business
(exploration, production, pipeline, and distribution), board characteristics (board size, members’ average age, average tenure, and percentage of stock ownership), chief
executive officer (CEO) tenure, firm sales, return on equity, and debt-to-asset ratio. None of these control variables is consistently significant across director types.
Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. Robust standard errors clustered on firms are in parentheses.
a N p 883 for accountants.
 Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
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numbers of company retirees and relatives on the board are also unaffected
by regulation. These suggest that, at least on these margins, regulated firms
do not appear to have weaker monitoring boards than unregulated firms.
These results further reinforce the idea that political directors are placed for
their knowledge of the regulatory environment rather than as mere window
dressing.
E. Proxy Statement Sample
Table 7 presents results of the models using the proxy statement data for
the period 1978–98. The first rows contain the cross-sectional results. Con-
sistent with the Moody’s data, we find that Washington lawyers are more
common on the boards of regulated firms. On average, the boards of regulated
firms have .925 more Washington lawyers than nonregulated firms. Non-
Washington lawyers are also more common, with an average .377 more on
the boards of regulated firms. The coefficient on regulators is positive but
not significant. In addition, composites 1 and 4 are statistically significant,
which indicates between .259 and .752 additional political directors depend-
ing on the measure.
As with the Moody’s data, the fixed-effects model requires a greatly re-
duced sample size (ranging from 179 to 535, depending on political category,
versus 619 in the cross-sectional model). Nevertheless, we find that Wash-
ington lawyers are more common on boards of regulated companies. We also
find that composites 1 and 4 are statistically significant and positive, which
indicates about .24 and .485 more directors who are either Washington law-
yers and/or former regulators on the boards of regulated firms.
Finally, the last rows present results for the model examining only newly
appointed directors. Here again we find that Washington lawyers are more
commonly appointed as new directors to the boards of regulated versus
unregulated firms. Likewise, composites 1 and 4 show a similar statistically
significant increase in the number of newly appointed political directors when
the company is regulated.
The last rows of Table 6 present results on the determinants for other
director types using the proxy statement data. In general, the results indicate
little difference between the boards of regulated companies and unregulated
companies in the numbers of other director types. Boards of regulated com-
panies are smaller, which is generally seen as indicating more effective mon-
itoring, and have fewer outside CEOs with experience in the industry. As
with the Moody’s sample, the numbers of retirees and relatives, other signs
of poor monitoring, are unaffected by regulation.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the role of political directors on the boards of
regulated companies. There are three possible explanations for the presence
TABLE 7
Impact of Regulation on the Number of Political Board Members by Type: Proxy Statement Data, 1978–98
Washington
Lawyers
(1)
Non-Washington
Lawyers
(2)
Former
Politicians
(3)
Former
Regulators
(4)
Composite 1
(5)
Composite 2
(6)
Composite 3
(7)
Composite 4
(8)
Cross-sectional estimation (N p 619):
Regulated firms .925**
(.331)
.377*
(.180)
.265
(.464)
.544
(.444)
.259
(.150)
.319
(.295)
.061
(.422)
.752*
(.297)
Firm-specific fixed effects:
Regulated firms .706**
(.260)
.174
(.185)
.201
(.300)
.172
(.460)
.240
(.139)
.294
(.193)
.094
(.278)
.485*
(.236)
Observations (N) 277 425 235 179 535 359 255 303
Companies 28 49 24 20 58 38 26 33
Cross-sectional estimation, for new
directors only (N p 619):
Regulated firms .828*
(.331)
.433*
(.176)
.280
(.437)
.322
(.480)
.305*
(.150)
.345
(.297)
.066
(.421)
.675*
(.301)
Note.—Values are the results of a Poisson model that estimates the number of board members of each type of political director. The four composite types are
defined as follows: composite 1 includes all four political types; composite 2, Washington lawyers, politicians, and regulators; composite 3, politicians and regulators;
and composite 4, Washington lawyers and regulators. Each cross-sectional specification includes controls for line of business (exploration, production, pipeline, and
distribution), board characteristics (board size, members’ average age, average tenure, and percentage of stock ownership), chief executive officer tenure, firm sales,
return on equity, and debt-to-asset ratio. For the sake of brevity, only the coefficient on regulation is presented below. In the cross-sectional models, firm size
(measured by sales) is uniformly positive and generally significant at the 5 percent level or better. Otherwise, none of the explanatory variables is consistently
significant across director types. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For non-fixed-effects estimation,
standard errors are clustered on firm.
 Significant at the 10% level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
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of these directors. The first explanation is that these directors play an advisory
role, providing information, expertise, and/or political access to resources
relative to the firm’s external environment. The second explanation is that
political directors serve the same function as other directors, namely, to
monitor the CEO. They simply have different backgrounds than other di-
rectors. Finally, it is possible that political directors are on the boards of
regulated firms as window dressing—they are poor monitors and unlikely to
challenge the CEO. If this is the case, political directors are associated with
regulation because regulated firms may be subject to less managerial
discipline.
We test these hypotheses using data from Moody’s Industrial Manuals,
Moody’s Public Utility Manuals, and Marquis Who’s Who in Commerce and
Industry, which cover the period 1930–90. We examine the regulation of
natural gas pipelines in 1938 and natural gas producers in 1954 and the 1986
deregulation of natural gas wellhead prices. We also estimate the effects of
wellhead price deregulation using data from annual proxy statements covering
the 1978–98 period. We estimate the effect of regulation on the number of
political directors using both cross-sectional and fixed-effects comparisons
of regulated and unregulated firms. We also analyze the number of directors
with political backgrounds who are newly appointed to boards of regulated
and unregulated firms.
The results presented in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that
political directors are added to boards primarily for their regulatory expertise,
whether it is used for rent-seeking purposes, to protect the firm’s quasi rents
from regulation, or simply to advise management as it navigates its regulatory
environment. Directors with a political background, such as Washington and
non-Washington lawyers, former politicians, and former regulators are all,
by various measures, more likely to serve on boards of firms that are subject
to regulation and become less likely to serve on boards of firms when reg-
ulation is removed.
We do find evidence of broader changes in the composition of corporate
boards in the 1930–90 sample period. For example, the number of inside
directors on corporate boards falls during the 1930–90 period. The link be-
tween these changes and regulation is tenuous at best. Finally, our conclusions
stand up to the argument that political directors are simply management
stooges that can be afforded under less-competitive, regulated environments.
We examine the possibility that regulated firms are simply less effectively
monitored and hence have more directors with political backgrounds simply
because they are less effective monitors than other types of directors. By a
variety of traditional corporate finance measures, we find no evidence that
regulated companies are less effectively monitored than nonregulated firms.
Thus, the value of individuals with political backgrounds as directors appears
tied to the presence of regulation, not to their general monitoring ability.
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